Encrypted storage. Signed receipts.
Client-side encryption, append-only proof history, and CLI-first workflows without key custody.
Config exports, build artifacts, vendor API responses, the output of a script you ran once and might need to defend later. They live in folders with timestamps in the filename. The timestamp is the upload time. Nothing proves the content.
Aurora Vault is the boring layer underneath that.
Files are encrypted on your machine before they leave it. The server stores opaque ciphertext — no filenames, no plaintext, no keys, no opinions about what you sent. Each upload receives a signed Ed25519 receipt and is added to an append-only hash-chain ledger. Later, from any machine, without contacting the server, you can verify the receipt signature and confirm ledger anchoring with a public key.
Vault reads from stdin. Anything your shell can produce, it can preserve.
Add those to cron and you have a verifiable record of how three systems looked over time. No agent. No SDK. No platform to adopt. Just one more verb at the end of a pipe.
Operators who want evidence that survives a vendor change. Researchers and engineers who need to prove a result existed before a publication or a decision. Builders who already work in a terminal and prefer infrastructure they can reason about in an evening.
If you want a dashboard, a sales call, or someone to manage your keys, this isn't for you. That's deliberate.
No browser drive. No sync client. No shared folders. No analysis of your data. No managed platform trying to grow into your stack. If we disappear tomorrow, your local receipts, keys, and any ciphertext you have exported or downloaded still make sense without us.
Requires a server URL and a bearer token from your paid claim code. vault setup prompts for both.
Vault is maintained. Release history →